Never Use Legality as a Guide to Morality

Zur Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Moral. The first thing to note is that the doctrine of just war is a moral doctrine that has both consequentialist and deontological components, and therefore it is quite rich, and to the extent that it provides a basis (whatever that means) for the laws of war, it carries a lot of weight; certainly more than appeals to the untheorized “moral intuitions” on which Kevin bases his argument. There is also a more general concern: if for some reason one has to distinguish between legal and moral considerations, it should be remembered that it is not obvious that morality provides the desired justification for legal principles, because morality is not something on which there is sufficient agreement. And all so-called moral principles are, to a large extent, a matter of serious, widespread and constant disagreement. Some philosophers defend consequentialism, others virtues and many versions of deontological representation. There are even more serious disagreements on metaethical issues dealing with questions of the nature of moral truth, semantics, and moral psychology, and again there is no agreement on what the appropriate path is. Okay, what we have are two statements that underlie your position on the morality of the drone program. One is that drone programs kill innocent people and the other claim is that such murder is not justified (killing has no opposing justification and therefore killing non-combatants is wrong). Now, this can be understood as an assertion made in the context of jus in bello, but it is not clear why you think such murder is not justified if it meets the jus in bello requirements of distinction and proportionality. You have admitted that I think these requirements are actually met by the drone program, and so the best way to interpret your assertion about morality is not as a matter of jus in bello, but rather as a matter of jus ad bellum. In other words, we should have you say that the program itself is not just because it involves the killing of non-combatants without proper justification; It`s not fair. However, this way of thinking on the subject is not very useful either, because the point on the killing of innocents is easily demonstrated that a. There are many things I agree with in these paragraphs.

I fully agree that we cannot simply compare murder in war to murder in peacetime. I also invited, of course, Bens to focus on the legality of collateral executions in wartime, drawing on criminal law to point out that many national criminal justice systems would consider the deaths of innocent people in drone strikes to be intentional. Finally, Ben is absolutely right when he points out that how these collateral deaths are perceived is necessarily influenced by the evaluation of the legality of the drone program. Errata: “The law depends on several ethical `isms` and often invokes moral principles and values, although it can rarely be affected.” “. Although these debates and discussions between legal theorists and legal philosophers have implications and fallouts (rhetorical analyses are useful in this regard). By the way, I tried to address some of the ways in which morality or a moral understanding is essential to “our” idea (or ideas) of the law, in response to an article by Thom Brooks here: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1804641 The article comes from a blog post (!), so one day it will be filled in with more care and detail. Needless to say, our moral critique of existing law has implications over time, as any historical review of the law will attest. Of course, this does not mean that the law is intended to fully serve purely moral purposes, or that the moral intentions or intentions that actually animate many theories, principles, doctrines or legal laws are recognized, let alone observed, if only because the gap between what “is” and what “should be” is persistent and difficult to bridge. In some ways, he even likes the necessary. Acknowledging all this, I always want to resist an idea that seems to underlie all the answers to my message: namely, that we cannot (or at least should not) consider collateral deaths from immoral drone strikes as long as those attacks were legal. I strongly disagree with that; I think it`s possible – and even important – to insist that the drone program is deeply immoral, even though no drone strike ever violates the laws of war.